Brian E. Dunleavy

Abraham Lincoln recognized that the US Civil War would be a "hard war". Secession and slavery represented abiding beliefs central to Southern life. Overcoming them would require a war of attrition resulting in much death and destruction, but Lincoln knew that the populous industrial North would prevail in a war of "grim mathematics". He hoped that in George McClellan he had found the general to wage this war.

McClellan, though young and bright, was not up to the task. Early in his tenure, he showed that he could organize a large army, but month upon month of inaction followed. McClellan politically favored preserving the Union for mercantile reasons, but slavery was a matter for the states to decide and therefore, negotiable. Reunion, he felt, did not require abolition. McClellan had talents as an organizer but could not bring himself "pull the trigger" on a decisive battle. Lincoln was finally able to coerce McClellan into proposing the Peninsular Campaign in the spring of 1862. The plan called for a massive amphibious operation which would deposit an army on the doorstep of Richmond and force a Confederate surrender. Lincoln did not like a plan as risky and costly as this, but reluctantly agreed.

McClellan endangered the success of his plan by avoiding direct engagement with the enemy and working his way up the peninsula at a snail''s pace. He lost the confidence and support of many of his subordinate generals. Phil Kearny was particularly aggrieved as he espoused a hard war and continuing contact with the enemy. After months of battles and squandered opportunities, McClellan ordered a retreat. His generals administered a final defeat to the Confederates at Malvern Hill but still were forced to withdraw to Harrison''s Landing where they were unable to generate further offensive operations.

McClellan had misused and betrayed the Army of the Potomac and failed to capitalize on their bravery and competence. His betrayal had only begun...